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ABSTRACT 
 
Estimating the Impact of Inequality on Growth and  
Unemployment in Indonesia 
Athia Yumna, M. Fajar Rakhmadi, M. Firman Hidayat, Sarah E. Gultom  
and Asep Suryahadi 
 
 
Increasing inequality is a growing concern is many parts of the world. This paper provides 
empirical evidence of the impact of inequality on economic growth and unemployment in the 
Indonesian context. Indonesia has experienced a significant and continuing increase in 
inequality since early 2000s. Using kabupaten (district)-level data for the period of 2000–2012, 
this study is able to overcome the empirical analysis problems faced by multicountry studies. 
Overall, the findings indicate that consumption inequality affects growth, while education 
inequality seems to be more important for unemployment. In general, the impact of inequality 
is nonlinear in the form of inverted U-shape for growth and U-shape for unemployment. 
Similarly, horizontal inequality across ethnic groups is also found to have nonlinear inverted 
U-shape relationship with growth. Meanwhile, horizontal inequality across religious groups 
has a nonlinear U-shape relationship with unemployment. These findings suggest that initially 
inequality may not be harmful for growth and employment; however, after reaching a 
threshold, it will have an adverse impact. This implies that it is important to put in place 
policies to address increasing inequality to mitigate its harmful impact. 
 
 
Keywords: inequality and growth, unemployment, district panel, Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
The SMERU Research Institute iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... i 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................... ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................... iv 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACTS OF 
INEQUALITY ON GROWTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT ............................................................... 2 
2.1 Link between Inequality and Growth .................................................................................... 2 
2.2 Link between Inequality and Unemployment ....................................................................... 6 
III. MEASURES OF INEQUALITY .................................................................................................... 6 
IV. THE MODEL AND THE DATA .................................................................................................... 8 
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS ........................................................................................................... 12 
5.1 Inequality and Growth ........................................................................................................ 12 
5.2 Inequality and Employment ................................................................................................ 16 
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS .......................................................................................................... 20 
VII. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................ 25 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 26 
APPENDIX 1   Table A1. Summary Statistics of Key Variables ....................................................... 30 
 
 
 
 
The SMERU Research Institute iv
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1.  Variable Definitions and Sources of Data 11 
Table 2.  How Initial Vertical Consumption Inequality (2000–2005) Relates  to Subsequent  
Growth (2006–2011) 13 
Table 3.  How Initial Consumption Inequality Relates to Subsequent Growth 14 
Table 4.  How Initial Education Inequality Relates to Subsequent Growth 14 
Table 5.  How Initial Fractionalization and Horizontal Inequalities Relate to  Long-Term  
Subsequent Growth 16 
Table 6.  How Initial Vertical Education Inequality (2000–2005) Relates to Subsequent 
Unemployment Rate (2006–2011) 17 
Table 7.  How Initial Consumption Inequality Relates to Subsequent Unemployment 18 
Table 8.  How Initial Education Inequality Relates to Subsequent Unemployment 18 
Table 9.  How Initial Fractionalization and Horizontal Inequalities Relate to  Long-Term  
Subsequent Unemployment 19 
Table 10. Robustness Check for the VIs—Growth Model (1) 20 
Table 11. Robustness Check for the VIs—Growth Model (2) 20 
Table 12. Robustness Check for the VIs—Unemployment Model (1) 21 
Table 13. Robustness Check for the VIs—Unemployment Model (2) 21 
Table 14. Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimations of Growth Models with Consumption 
Inequality 23 
Table 15. Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimations of Growth Models with Education 
Inequality 24 
 
 
 
 
 
The SMERU Research Institute 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Inequality is on the rise in Indonesia. Until 2007, Indonesia experienced a stable level of 
inequality, as measured by the Gini ratio using household consumption data. The Gini ratio 
used to fluctuate between 0.32 and 0.36. However, the ratio has increased rapidly from 0.36 in 
2007 to 0.41 in 2011, which is the highest recorded in Indonesia. As a matter of fact, there is a 
growing concern about the current trend of rising inequality, not only in developed countries, 
but also in emerging and developing countries. See, for example, the inequality report ‘Divided 
we Stand’ launched by OECD in 2011, the ‘Inequality Matters’ report published by the UN in 
2013, and several research reports published by the IMF (Berg and Ostry, 2011; Ostry et al. 
2014) and the ILO (Luebker, 2012). 
 
Whether the increase in inequality is something to be worried about or not, however, is still 
debatable. Some argue that inequality in income or consumption is necessary for accumulation 
of assets that will in turn be invested in technological advances that are necessary for long-
term growth. Income inequality is also considered as the outcome of differences in “input”, 
which is investment in human capital, particularly education, and is necessary for providing 
market incentive for the investment.  
 
On the other hand, income/consumption inequality is usually closely related to other forms of 
inequality such as inequality in access to education, health, and public services, which in 
general is manifested in inequality of opportunity. These other dimensions of inequality are 
considered to have significant detrimental effects on economic growth and poverty reduction, 
and even political and social stability. Several studies worldwide show that a high level of 
inequality is detrimental to long-term growth and sustainable welfare improvement (see review 
in Perrson and Tabellini, 1994 and Benabou, 1996 ). 
 
In addition to inequalities between individuals or households (vertical inequalities), inequalities 
between groups (horizontal inequalities) are also considered harmful to social stability. 
Stewart, Brown, and Mancini (2005) argue that horizontal inequality matters as people’s well-
being is not only affected by their individual condition but also their relative circumstances 
within their group. For the case of Indonesia, a study by Mancini (2005) provides empirical 
evidence that horizontal inequality—in the form of religious polarization—has impacted on 
the incidence of violent conflict.  
 
Various research results find that the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth is somewhat ambiguous. These differences are highly affected by various factors, 
including the correlations between income inequality and other dimensions of inequality, 
which in turn is often affected by government policies and programs. Therefore, it is crucial to 
consider not only income/consumption inequality but also other dimensions of inequality, not 
only vertical but also horizontal inequality. 
 
In Indonesia, there are only limited studies looking at the issue of inequality. Most studies look 
at the decomposition of inequality and the sources of inequality (Booth, 2000; Akita, 2003, 
Yusuf et al., 2013; Miranti et al., 2013). Increasing understanding of the changes and the 
features of inequalities (not only income or consumption inequality but also other dimensions 
of inequality and not only vertical but also horizontal inequality) as well as the impact of 
inequality are necessary for decentralized Indonesia. Given that inequality results from and is 
affected by various factors, a common understanding on why it is important to tackle 
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inequality and what policy options are available is very important for local through to national 
governments as well as international communities.  
 
In light of this, this paper aims to investigate empirically the impacts of various types of 
inequality on economic growth and unemployment in Indonesia. Because rising inequality is a 
recent phenomenon in Indonesia, there is only a short time-series data at the national level. 
Therefore, this study analyzes a comprehensive kabupaten (district)-level panel dataset from 
2000 to 2012. The findings of this paper will enrich the evidence to further understand the 
inequality puzzle in the Indonesian as well as other developing countries’ contexts. 
  
This study is important and very relevant in at least two ways. First, despite the growing 
concerns about rising inequality around the globe and in Indonesia, empirical evidence on the 
impact of inequality on socioeconomic outcomes in Indonesia and developing countries in 
general is still lacking. Second, the Indonesian context provides a rich setting to address some 
empirical issues that plague previous studies, which are mainly based on cross-country 
analysis. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. First, the following section (II) presents some theoretical 
frameworks and previous relevant empirical findings regarding the relationship between 
inequality and prosperity, notably economic growth and unemployment rates. Section III 
discusses in detail some measures of inequality. Section IV explores the model and the data 
used in this paper. We present and discuss the estimation results of the impact of inequality on 
growth and unemployment in Section V and their robustness checks in Section VI. Finally, 
Section VI brings some conclusions and offers some policy recommendations. 
 
 
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACTS OF INEQUALITY ON 
GROWTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
 
2.1 Link between Inequality and Growth 
 
Interconnections between inequality and development, particularly economic growth, can be 
explained by two-way causal relationships. First, how does economic development affect 
inequality? The seminal work of Kuznets (1955) provides a foundation for understanding this 
relationship. He argues that as the economy grows inequality first increases and later 
decreases. This is what is referred to as Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothesis.  
 
As explained in Barro (2000), Kuznets’ idea centered on the idea of workers’ movements from 
agriculture to industry. In this model, the agricultural and rural sector initially constitutes the 
bulk of the economy. This sector features low per capita income and, perhaps, relatively little 
inequality within the sector. The industrial and urban sector starts out small, has higher per 
capita income and, possibly, a relatively high degree of inequality within the sector. Economic 
development involves a shift of workers and resources from agriculture to industry. The 
workers who move experience a rise in per capita income, and this change raises the 
economy’s overall degree of inequality. Consequently, at early stages of development, the 
relationship between the level of per capita income and the extent of inequality tends to be 
positive. 
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As the size of the agricultural sector diminishes and industry grows, the main effect on 
inequality from continuing urbanization is that more of the poor agricultural workers are 
enabled to join the relatively rich industrial sector. This will reduce the overall inequality. 
Hence, at later stages of development, the relationship between the level of per capita income 
and the extent of inequality tends to be negative.  
 
Based on Indonesian experience, some researchers argue that Indonesia did not follow 
Kuznets’ prediction in its early stage of development. For three decades before the Asian 
financial crisis (AFC), Indonesia experienced sustained high growth while maintaining a stable 
Gini ratio (around 0.32 to 0.36). However, the story changed after recovering from the AFC. 
Even though the economy has been able to recover fairly quickly after the AFC and was quite 
robust in the face of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Gini ratio increased rapidly 
reaching its highest ever peak of 0.41 in 2011 (Tadjoeddin, 2013a; 2013b). 
 
Indonesia is actually not a unique case. Deininger and Squire (1998) point out that many 
countries that started with low levels of per capita income grew rapidly without an increase in 
inequality. On the other hand, other countries that failed to grow were not immune against 
possibly considerable swings in aggregate measures of inequality. In the few countries where a 
significant relationship emerges between growth and inequality, it contradicts the Kuznets 
hypothesis almost as often as confirms it.  
 
The second causal relationship is how does inequality affect economic development? Many 
literature strands on the impact of inequality on economic development, mainly on economic 
growth, have been developed over centuries. In this section, we briefly introduce some main 
theories in which different paths of causation have been explored in hundreds of research 
papers. The main paths that have been featured are: the classical approach (saving rates), the 
political economy approach (redistribution), the credit market imperfections channel, the rent-
seeking approach, the social unrest (political instability) approach, and the latest one is the 
unified theory of inequality and growth. 
 
2.1.1 The Classical Approach 
 
The classical approach advances the hypothesis that inequality is beneficial for growth. This 
theory suggests that the marginal savings rate increases with wealth by directing more income 
to high saving capitalists (Lewis in Easterly, 2007 and Galor, 2009; Kaldor in Easterly, 2007 
and Galor, 2009). Inequality channels resources towards individuals whose marginal 
propensity to save is higher, results in higher aggregate savings and more capital accumulation, 
then increases economic growth. 
 
The theory have been challenged in the past two decades as both later theories and empirical 
evidence increasingly have revealed the opposite direction of inequality impact on the growth 
process (see, among others, Galor and Zeira, 1993; Benabou, 1996; Aghion, Caroli, and 
Garcia-Penalosa, 1999) through various mechanisms. In addition to those criticisms, Venieris 
and Gupta (1986) also demonstrate that the bulk of savings is in fact produced by the middle 
income class and not by the rich.  
 
2.1.2 The Political Economy Approach 
 
The main theoretical hypothesis in the political economy approach is that income inequality is 
harmful for growth, because it leads to policies that do not protect property rights and do not 
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allow full private appropriation of returns from investment. High inequality will lower growth 
because the poor majority would vote for redistributive rather than growth-enhancing policies. 
Redistribution policies (taxes and transfers) are chosen by the median voter and in an unequal 
society the median voter is poorer than the mean. Taxes imposed on the margin are 
distortionary and slow growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994).  
 
The logic of this approach, as explained in Barro (2000), is as follows: If the mean income in 
an economy exceeds the median income, then a system of majority voting tends to favor 
redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor. These taxes and transfer payments can 
also involve public-expenditure programs (such as education and child care) and regulatory 
policies that can distort economic decisions and thus lower growth. The idea is that by 
lowering the income of the median voter or pivotal middle class relative to the national 
average, greater inequality increases the pressure for redistribution. This, in turn, discourages 
investment and economic growth (Benabou, 1996). 
 
However, subsequent theories have challenged the inconsistency of a negative relationship 
between inequality and growth in the political economy approach. An alternative mechanism 
has predicted a contrary hypothesis, which is a positive relationship between inequality and 
growth (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993 and 1996; Benabou, 1996; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997). 
For example, Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) developed a model that predicts that in more 
unequal societies, the median voter will elect a higher rate of taxation to finance public 
education though they are not the decisive voter, which will increase aggregate human capital 
and economic growth.  
 
In addition to that, Li and Zou (1998) examine both theoretically and empirically whether 
inequality can actually lead to higher economic growth if public consumption enters the 
household utility function. However, they consider a different channel that links redistribution 
with growth. They argue that a more equal society may lead to a higher income tax and in turn 
lower economic growth. On the other hand, higher inequality can actually lead to lower 
income taxation and thus higher growth.  
 
2.1.3 The Credit Market Imperfections Channel 
 
Galor and Zeira (1993) demonstrate that in the presence of credit market imperfections and 
fixed costs associated with investment in education, occupational choices (and thus the 
efficient segmentation of the labor force between skilled and unskilled workers) are affected 
by the distribution of income. In particular, if the interest rate for borrowers is significantly 
higher than that for lenders, inequality may result in an under-investment in human capital.  
 
As large segments of the population in poor countries do not possess initial wealth, 
investment has to be financed through credit. Because of constraints in the credit market, 
many poor people cannot afford to borrow. Consequently, as education represent high initial 
costs which only pays off in the long run, limitations in the access to credit makes poor 
households forego human-capital investments, which would offer relatively high rates of 
return (Barro, 2000). 
 
On the aggregate level, countries with high inequality thus invest less in human capital and are 
less able to benefit from technological innovations, meaning  that they grow more slowly and 
remain poor (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Inequality may therefore adversely affect 
macroeconomic activity and economic development in the short-term, and due to 
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intergenerational transfers and their effect on the persistence of inequality, it may adversely 
affect economic development in the long-term as well (Galor, 2009). 
 
2.1.4 Rent-Seeking (Institutional Mechanism) 
 
This theory explores the situation in which the gap between rich and poor widens, and the 
latter may have a greater temptation to engage in rent-seeking or predatory activities at the 
expense of the former (Benabou, 1996). Others researchers have also proposed an 
institutional mechanism in which a rich elite will suppress democracy and equal rights before 
the law so as to preserve their privileged position. (e.g., Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000 in 
Easterly, 2007).  
 
Acemoglu (2005) also has developed a model in which the oligarchy impedes democracy to 
maintain its privileges. Moreover, Rajan and Zingales (2006) argue that the oligarchy and the 
educated middle class will form a coalition against education for the uneducated poor so as to 
prevent both large scale reform and erosion of the rents accruing to the already educated. 
They, however, do not provide an empirical evidence to support their argument.  
 
Another approach elucidates the effects of social fractionalization on growth. For example, 
Easterly and Levine (1997) relate growth and per capita income directly to ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and find a negative relationship between them. 
 
2.1.5 Social Unrest (Political Instability) 
 
This theory puts its argument on the motivation of the poor to engage in crime, riots, and 
other disruptive activities due to the wealth and income Inequality (Barro, 2000). The stability 
of political institutions may even be threatened by revolution, so that laws and other rules 
have shorter than expected duration and greater uncertainty. The participation of the poor in 
crime and other antisocial actions represents a direct waste of resources because the time and 
energy of the criminals are not devoted to productive efforts. Moreover, threats to property 
rights discourage investment. Through these various dimensions of sociopolitical unrest, more 
inequality tends to reduce the productivity of an economy and economic growth declines 
accordingly. 
 
High inequality could also lead to politically unstable institutions as power swings back 
and forth between redistributive populist factions and oligarchy-protecting conservative 
factions (Perotti, 1996; Benabou, 1996). Meanwhile, political instability itself lowers 
growth (Alesina et al., 1996). 
 
2.1.6 The Unified Theory of Inequality and Growth (Human Capital Mechanism) 
 
This theory is a form of reconciliation between the classical approach and the credit market 
imperfections approach. Imperfect capital markets will prevent human capital accumulation by 
the poor majority. On the other hand, the effect of inequality on growth depends on the relative 
return to both physical and human capital. Physical capital is a prime engine for growth in the 
early stages of industrialization but later it is substituted by human capital and relative return to 
physical capital decrease. Thus, the impact of inequality on growth goes from positive to 
negative (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2004; Galor, 2009). In addition, assortative 
matching between marriage partners or other sorting also prevents human capital accumulation 
and in turn will result in rising inequality and decreasing growth (Fernandez; Fernandez and 
Rogerson in Easterly, 2007). 
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2.2 Link between Inequality and Unemployment 
 
In contrast to the relationship between inequality and growth that has been hotly debated for 
decades, discussions on the link between inequality and unemployment are rather scant. 
Furthermore, the few available studies discuss only the impact of unemployment on 
inequality. We could not find studies that examine the other impact in the other direction. 
 
On the other hand, today in real life we see that a major consequence of high and persistent 
unemployment is increasing social discontent and the risk of social unrest, which, according to 
the World of Work report (ILO, 2011), is largely motivated by inequality. In fact, it is clear in 
some regions such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia that high and persistent 
unemployment is related not only with higher poverty rates, but also with higher inequality, 
since the unemployed lose proportionally more than the employed (Nickell, 1990 in Castells-
Quintana and Royuela, 2012). However, this may be less clear for the case of Indonesia since 
unemployment does not necessarily relate to poverty. The poor need to work even harder to 
meet their basic needs. 
 
Castells-Quintana and Royuela (2012) argue that the factors that provide the theoretical base 
to expect that high and persistent unemployment reduces growth seem to be closely 
associated to inequality. Furthermore, they argue that unemployment is likely to lead to 
increasing inequality. Therefore, they find that the negative impact of high unemployment 
rates on long-run growth will be more relevant when high and persistent unemployment is 
linked to increasing inequality.  
 
Leibbrandt et al. (n.d.) elaborates on the employment and inequality situation in South Africa. 
It is well-known that income has become increasingly concentrated in the top income deciles 
at the expense of all other deciles in post-apartheid South Africa. This discrepancy is 
reinforced by the fact that labor force participation rates are highest in the top income deciles, 
which also have the highest labor absorption rates. Therefore, it is relatively clear that income 
source decompositions identify the labor market as the leading factor driving inequality in 
South Africa.  
 
In addition to income inequality, education inequality among racial groups in South Africa 
could also explain high levels of unemployment amongst Africans, as well as their lower 
average wages. Education policy under apartheid was starkly inequitable across people of 
different races. The majority of state resources were diverted to schools in “white” areas, 
while the population living in “black” areas was subjected to very low quality schooling. 
Despite massive shifts in the allocation of state resources, educational inequalities have proven 
to be remarkably persistent. Inequality in quality of education also becomes another major 
problem, particularly for Africans. Hence, low skill levels result in low wages and become a 
barrier to employment, which reinforces the vicious cycle of poverty and inequality. 
 
 
 
III. MEASURES OF INEQUALITY 
 
 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction, inequality has many dimensions. Income or 
consumption inequality is one of the inequality measures that have received the most attention 
from economists. However, income or consumption inequality shall not be assumed as the 
one and only measure. There are potential non-income or non-economic measures of 
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inequality we should consider as important as income or other economic inequality that have 
significant impact on socioeconomic development,  people’s well-being and status, and even 
political and social stability. 
 
In addition to that, most existing discussions and concerns about inequality measurement 
concentrate on vertical inequality, or inequality among individuals. We tend to ignore another 
important measure, called horizontal inequality that appraises inequalities between groups. 
Stewart, Brown, and Mancini (2005) argue that horizontal inequality matters as people’s well-
being is not only affected by individual condition but also their relative circumstances within 
their group.  
 
Group inequality can be both important instrumentally for achieving other objectives and in 
itself. Three instrumental reasons are offered in the literature: (i) reducing group inequality 
promotes efficiency, and means that any system in which one group is discriminated against is 
likely to be less efficient than in the absence of discrimination since talented people in the 
discriminated group will be held back, and less talented people from the favored group will get 
resources or positions; (ii) group inequality can be a source of violent conflict, which means 
that leaders can have powerful grievances to mobilize people to engage in political protest if 
group inequality and group exploitation exist; (iii) group inequality may facilitate a more 
effective targeting; it might be difficult to improve individuals’ position or well-being without 
considering their group position (Stewart, Brown, and Mancini, 2005).  
 
Considering the importance of alternative measurements of inequality, in this paper we 
introduce several dimensions of inequality, not only the dimension of income/consumption 
but also education inequality (in terms of mean years of schooling), and also take into account 
both inequality among individuals (vertical inequality) as well as inequality between groups 
(horizontal inequality). 
 
We use the traditional Gini ratio of consumption to measure the vertical inequality at the 
kabupaten level. Furthermore, we add another dimension of non-economic inequality, i.e., Gini 
ratio of education, measured in terms of mean years of schooling. Following Stewart, Brown, 
and Mancini (2005), the Gini ratio is formulated in Equation (1). 
 
ܩܫܰܫ ൌ  
1
2݊ଶݕത
෍ ෍หݕ௜ െ ݕ௝ห
௡
௝
௡
௜
 
           (1) 
 
ݕ௜ : the expenditure/mean years of schooling (education) of individual ݅ 
ݕ௝ : the expenditure/mean years of schooling (education) of individual ݆ 
ݕത : the sample mean of expenditure/mean years of schooling (education) 
݊ : the sample size 
 
The Gini ratio has an advantage that it compares every individual with every other and does 
not square the differences. It is especially sensitive to the middle of distribution.1 
 
Meanwhile, for horizontal inequality, we use two measures: group Gini (GGINI) and 
weighted group coefficient of variation (WGCOV). The horizontal inequality measures group 
                                                 
1There are other popular measures of vertical inequality such as the Theil indices. Here, we focus on Gini Ratio 
as it is officially used to measure inequality in Indonesia. 
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people based on their characteristics such as religion, ethnicity, language, race, rural-urban 
location, etc. and then compares welfare conditions across groups within a characteristic. Both 
of the GGINI and the WGCOV in this paper group people based on religion and ethnicity 
and measure inequality in the educational dimension, proxied by mean years of schooling, also 
at the kabupaten level.2 In addition, we also measure spatial inequality using group Gini 
kecamatan (subdistrict) based on the mean years of  schooling by kecamatan.  
 
Also following Stewart, Brown, and Mancini (2005), the group Gini is formulated in Equation 
(2), while the Weighted Group Coefficient of Variation is formulated in Equation (3). 
 
ܩܩܫܰܫ ൌ  
1
2ݕത
෍ ෍ ݌௥݌௦|ݕത௥ െ ݕത௦|
ௌ
௦
ோ
௥
 
           (2) 
 
ݕത : the sample mean of mean years of schooling (education) 
݌௥: the ethnicity/religion group r population share 
݌௦: the ethnicity/religion group s population share 
ݕത௥: the mean of mean years of schooling (education) of group r 
ݕത௦: the mean of mean years of schooling (education) of group s 
 
 
ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܩܥܱܸ ൌ
1
ݕ
൭෍ ݌௥ሺݕത௥ െ ݕሻଶ
ோ
௥
൱
ଵ
ଶ
 
           (3) 
 
ݕത : the sample mean of mean years of schooling (education) 
݌௥: the ethnicity/religion group r population share 
ݕത௥: the mean of mean years of schooling (education) of group r 
 
The WGCOV in principle is the standard deviation divided by the mean weighted by the size 
of the population. The coefficient of variation involves squaring the deviations from the 
mean, thus put more weight to the extremes. It only measures differences from the mean, not 
every difference with every other group. However, the WGCOV has the advantage that it is 
less sensitive to variation in the number of religious/ethnic groups across kabupaten.  
 
 
 
IV. THE MODEL AND THE DATA 
 
 
To investigate the relationships between inequality and prosperity variables (with proxies of 
growth and unemployment), we mainly draw the model from the existing literature. Cross-
country literatures (Perrson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996; Deininger and Squire, 1998; 
                                                 
2We do not include consumption in the horizontal inequality measure because consumption variable is not 
available in the Population Census data. 
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Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000) employ a limited dependent variable model to investigate the link 
between inequality and growth. Perotti (1996) estimates growth as a function of initial 
inequality, income, male and female human capital, and market distortions. Forbes (2000) 
replicates Perotti’s model and adds country and time dummy variables in her country-panel 
dataset. The country dummy variable is used to control for time-invariant omitted-variable 
bias, while the time dummy variable is included to control for global shocks which might 
have an impact on growth in any time period but not captured by the explanatory variables 
in the model.  
 
In their empirical model, Perrson and Tabellini (1994) put per capita growth as their dependent 
variable, while for the independent variables they use income distribution of the top 20 per cent 
of the population as a function of inequality, political participation to control the median voter 
that could influence redistribution policy in the country, average skills of the young generation as 
well as the variables that measure the level of development of the country. 
 
Barro (2000) estimates a panel regression of growth rate on Gini and controlled by log per 
capita GDP, as well as an array of policy variables such as government consumption/GDP, 
rule of law index, democracy index (electoral rights), and the rate of inflation. He also included 
human capital measures such as years of schooling, total fertility rate, as well as the ratio of 
investment to GDP, and lastly, the growth rate of terms of trade.  
 
However, it is obvious that the use of cross-country data for assessing empirical relationships 
between inequality and growth faces some econometric issues. The first is measurement error. 
The definition of key variables may vary between countries, the accuracy of data collection 
also influences the reliability and validity of the data. Though some authors claim that they 
employ high quality inequality data (Deininger and Squire, 1998; Forbes 2000), a concern over 
low quality inequality data is still valid for some countries, especially developing and poor 
countries. The second problem is omitted-variable bias that causes the bias in the coefficient 
estimates and standard errors. The bias is resulted from any variables that actually explain 
growth and not correlated with any of the regressors but are not included in the regression.  
 
Some efforts have been made to address the empirical challenges that plague the cross-
country analysis (Ravallion 1998, Balisacan and Fuwa undated, Qin et al., 2009, Benjamin et al. 
2011). One of those is to exploit country-level setting to permit the same definitions of key 
variables in the regressions, thus reduce the measurement errors. It also permits better 
isolation of the impact of the inequality from unobserved factors, while at the same time, 
provide some spatial differences between regions or other unit of observations in the country.  
 
In the light of this, we try to address these two crucial empirical issues in the inequality and 
growth nexus by exploiting a rich panel dataset of all kabupaten in Indonesia during 2000–
2012. In other words, we replicate cross-country analysis as in the previous works to the 
kabupaten-level setting over a 12-years period. Measurement error could be minimized by using 
this approach because we examine the same data sources and definitions across kabupaten. 
Moreover, using a panel instead of standard cross-section data is another method of reducing 
omitted-variable bias in the regressions.  
 
A set of control variables that is assumed to help explain the kabupaten growth are also 
included in our model in addition to the main explanatory variables as in the previous work on 
cross-country analysis. These consist of variables which proxy the economic development, 
population and demographic characteristics, as well as geography-related conditions at the 
kabupaten level (see Table 1 for details).   
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Our main model (Equation 4) estimates growth and unemployment in the current period as a 
function of inequality in the previous period, controlled by regional per capita income, male 
and female human capital, and other control variables representing the level of kabupaten 
economic development and population, all in the previous period, and also geography, 
represented by island dummy variables. The variables are listed and defined in Table 1. To 
estimate the models, we use the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
 
݃௜௧ ൌ  ߚଵ ܫ݊݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܯ݈ܽ݁ܧ݀ݑܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚସ ܨ݈݁݉ܽ݁ܧ݀ݑܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ෍ ߚ௝ 
௞
௝
௜ܺ,௧ିଵ ൅ ݅ݏ݈ܽ݊݀ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௜ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
           (4) 
 
In equation (4), ݅ represents each kabupaten and ݐ represents time period; ݃௜௧  is average annual 
kabupaten total growth for kabupaten ݅ during period ݐ or average kabupaten unemployment rate 
for  kabupaten ݅ during period ݐ;  Inequalityi,t-1 is vertical inequality (consumption or education 
Gini ratio) in the previous period or initial horizontal inequality (GGINI or WGCOV based 
on religion/ethnicity or GGINI kecamatan) for kabupaten ݅ during period ݐ; ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜,௧ିଵ is 
average per capita kabupaten gross regional domestic product (GRDP) in the previous period;  
MaleEducationi,t-1 and FemaleEducationi,t-1 are average male and female mean years of 
schooling in the previous period;  ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ is a set of other control variables for kabupaten ݅ in 
the previous period; and ݑ௜௧ is the error term. We also include a demographic fractionalization 
(religion and ethnic fractionalization) as another independent variable in the model; this 
variable is used as a substitute of horizontal inequality measure in separate regressions.3 
 
In addition to the linear model, we also exploit a nonlinear model which involves squaring the 
inequality variables. This is inspired by Banerjee and Duflo (2003), who mention the 
possibility of nonlinear relationship between inequality and growth rates in cross-country data. 
 
The unit of observation in this model is kabupaten level using a kabupaten-level panel data-set 
with annual observation for the period of 2000 to 2012. Because many new kabupaten were 
established during this period, all datasets are realigned to match the 2000 kabupaten borders. 
The list of final data set, including the sources of the data, is reported in Table 1 and the 
descriptive statistics of key variables are available in Appendix 1. 
  
                                                 
3Fractionalization is measured as ܨ ൌ 1 െ ∑ ݌௥ଶ
௃
௝ , where ݌௥is group r’s population share. We also define a binary 
variable of heterogeneity (=1 if fractionalization (Fe or Fr)>0.1; otherwise). 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources of Data 
List of Variables Definition  Source of Data 
Dependent variables  
Economic growth  Kabupaten GRDP growth  BPS  
Unemployment  Kabupaten unemployment rate  Susenas 00-12  
Independent variables  
Vertical inequalities  Consumption inequality measures  Susenas 2000-2012  
 Education inequality measures (years of 
schooling)  
Susenas 2000-2012  
Horizontal inequalities  Religious group inequality measures (mean of 
key variable by religious group). The key 
variable is years of schooling  
Population Census 
2000 & 2010  
 Ethnic group inequality measures (mean of key 
variable by ethnic group). The key variable is 
years of schooling 
Population Census 
2000 & 2010  
 Spatial group inequality measures (mean of key 
variable by kecamatan). The key variable is 
years of schooling 
Population Census 
2000 & 2010  
Fractionalization Fractionalization based on ethnicity (Fe), 
fractionalization based on religion (Fr), 
heterogeneity based on ethnicity (heteroe), and 
heterogeneity based on religion (heteror)  
Population Census 
2000 & 2010  
Control Variables 
Economic development   
Log GRDP per capita Kabupaten Log per Capita Gross Regional 
Domestic Product (GRDP) 
Susenas and 
Kabupaten GRDP 
2000-2012 
Initial unemployment rate 
(only in employment 
model) 
Unemployment rate in kabupaten level Susenas 2000-2012 
Asphalt road Share of villages with asphalt main road in a 
kabupaten 
Podes 2003, 2005, 
2008, 2011 
Electricity Number of households with electricity in a 
kabupaten  
Podes 2003, 2005, 
2008, 2011 
Poverty rate Poverty rate kabupaten BPS Poverty Data and 
Publications 
Population   
Log population size Log population kabupaten Susenas 2000-2012 
Proportion of young people Proportion of population 16-24 years old in a 
kabupaten 
Susenas 2000-2012 
Female years of schooling Mean years of schooling in a kabupaten: 
Female  
Susenas 2000-2012 
Male years of schooling Mean years of schooling in a kabupaten: Male Susenas 2000-2012 
Geography   
Dummy island Dummy variable of the major island where a 
kabupaten is located 
Susenas 2000-2012 
Mountainous area Percentage of villages in  mountainous area in a 
kabupaten 
Podes 2003, 2005, 
2008, 2011 
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V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 Inequality and Growth 
 
5.1.1 Vertical Inequality 
 
To measure the impact of inequality on growth, we first split our dataset into two periods 
(2000–2005 and 2006–2011) and construct the variables of average of subsequent growth 
(2006–2011) and initial vertical inequality (2000–2005) at the kabupaten level as the main 
dependent and independent variables. This approach mitigates the effect of transitory 
(contemporaneous) shocks and measurement errors in the model estimation.  
 
The main estimation results from the growth model are presented in Table 2. It shows that 
three out of the four models estimated have no significant inequality coefficients. The 
exception is specification (3), which is the nonlinear model of consumption inequality. This 
model implies that initially an increase in inequality increases growth, but after reaching the 
peak point, further increase in inequality reduces growth. However, only the coefficient of 
Gini ratio is statistically significant, while the coefficient of Gini ratio square is not significant.  
 
The implied peak point of Gini ratio from the coefficients is 0.3. Meanwhile, Appendix 1 
shows that the average Gini ratio of all kabupaten during 2000–2012 is 0.29. Since inequality 
has continued to increase during the period, this implies that now Indonesia has already 
passed the peak point and the impact of inequality on growth is in the negative trajectory.  
 
To check if different period splitting will give different results, we replicate Benjamin, Brandt, 
Giles (2010) for China’s case, in which they run the model using different beginning and end 
points. This exercise could also give us an idea about the relationship between inequality and 
growth over time. We divide the period into four equal length sub-periods: 2000-2002, 2003-
2005, 2006-2008, and 2009-2011. We estimate the models using the same covariates as in the 
main models in Table 2. The results are summarized in Table 3 for consumption inequality 
and Table 4 for education inequality. 
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Table 2. How Initial Vertical Consumption Inequality (2000–2005) Relates  
to Subsequent Growth (2006–2011) 
  Linear Model Nonlinear Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
gini0005 0.043 0.976* 
(0.052) (0.553) 
gini0005^2 -1.658 
(1.019) 
edugini0005 -0.068 2.218 
(0.116) (1.995) 
edugini0005^2 -6.968 
(6.018) 
lpcgrdp0005 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
unemployment0005 0.005 0.002 -0.015 0.007 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) 
p00005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lpopulasi0005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
asphaltroad0005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
yearofschoolm0005 0.010* 0.011* 0.010* 0.011* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
yearofschoolf0005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
young0005 -0.044 -0.040 -0.031 -0.040 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) 
mountain0005 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
_cons 0.047 0.064 -0.086 -0.121 
(0.037) (0.051) (0.089) (0.166) 
Island dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-sq 0.201 0.200 0.209 0.202 
N 287 287 287 287 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*10% significant.  
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
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Table 3. How Initial Consumption Inequality Relates to Subsequent Growth 
Beginning Period 
  Endpoint Period 
  2003–2005 2006–2008 2009–2011 
Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear 
2000–2002 Gini 0.032 0.213 0.045 0.872 0.077 0.837 
Gini^2   -0.327   -1.494   -1.372 
2003–2005 Gini 0.043 0.401 0.068 0.421 
Gini^2       -0.625   -0.614 
2006–2008 Gini -0.006 1.017 
Gini^2           -1.69 
Notes: the reported numbers are the coefficients of the effect of inequality on growth with the same covariates as in Table 2.  
*10% significant  
**5% significant 
***1% significant 
 
Table 4. How Initial Education Inequality Relates to Subsequent Growth 
  Endpoint Period 
Beginning Period 2003–2005 2006–2008 2009–2011 
Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear 
2000–2002 Edugini 0.314* 1.127 0.012 0.992 0.23 5.049** 
Edugini^2   -2.469   -2.979   -14.648* 
2003–2005 Edugini -0.141 -0.971 -0.075 1.669 
Edugini^2       2.57   -5.399 
2006–2008 Edugini -0.23 2.77 
Edugini^2           -8.942 
Notes: the reported numbers are the coefficients of the effect of inequality on growth with the same covariates as in Table 2.  
*10% significant. 
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
 
Table 3 shows that most coefficients have the signs that are consistent with the main results in 
Table 2, i.e. positive in the linear models and inverted U-shape in the nonlinear models. 
However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting that breaking the 
period into shorter periods dilutes the impact of inequality on growth. This implies that only if 
the increase in inequality is sustained for a sufficiently long period will its impact on growth 
become significant. 
 
Interestingly, for education inequality, using 2000–2002 as the beginning point, we find a 
positive linear impact on growth in the immediate subsequent period of 2003–2005. The 
impact then disappeared in the following period (2006–2008), but appeared again in the 2009–
2011 period in a nonlinear (inverted U-shape) form. The implied peak point of education 
inequality from the coefficients is a Gini ratio of 0.175, while the mean is 0.173. Since 2000–
2002 is the recovery period following the Asian financial crisis (AFC), these results seem to 
suggest that marked differences in education levels in society is beneficial for pushing growth 
in a recovery period, but its latent impact in the long term is an inverted U-shape.  
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5.1.2 Horizontal Inequality 
 
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results of the effects of fractionalization and horizontal 
inequalities on economic growth. We use horizontal inequality in 2000 as the main 
independent variable and subsequent long-term growth (geometric mean 2001–2012) as the 
dependent variable. We also estimate the impact of horizontal inequality in 2000 to 
subsequent growth in shorter period of time (2001–2006) to check if there are differences 
between shorter and longer period impacts. We estimate the models using the same covariates 
as in Table 2. 
 
The results show that the initial ethnic fractionalizations seem to have positive linear impact 
on subsequent growth both in shorter and long-term subsequent growth. The coefficient of 
heterogeneity is also positive and significant, indicating that higher heterogeneity at the 
kabupaten level is associated with higher subsequent growth. However, for both measures of 
initial horizontal inequality across ethnic groups (WGCOVe and GGINIe), there are 
significant nonlinear (inverted U-shape) relationships between initial inequality in 2000 and 
subsequent economic growth during 2001–2012.  
 
For inequality across religious groups, there are only significant linear relationships between 
initial heterogeneity of the kabupaten and the subsequent growth both in shorter and longer-
term periods. However, we find no significant relation between religious fractionalization as 
well as initial horizontal inequality both measured by GGINI and WGCOV in 2000 and 
subsequent economic growth during 2001-2012 and 2001-2006.  
 
Finally, the estimation results show a significant nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between 
initial spatial inequality (as measured by group Gini kecamatan in 2000) and subsequent long 
term growth during 2001–2012. Thus this also indicates that inequality within and between 
kecamatan in one kabupaten first reduces long-term subsequent kabupaten growth then increases 
the kabupaten growth. This suggests that kabupaten with differing levels of development across 
kecamatan have higher growth rates than kabupaten with more equal kecamatan, perhaps because 
the left behind kecamatan grow faster in order to catch up with their neighbors. 
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Table 5. How Initial Fractionalization and Horizontal Inequalities Relate to  
Long-Term Subsequent Growth 
HI Variables 2000 
Subsequent Growth  
2001–2012   
Subsequent Growth  
2001–2006 
Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear 
ethnicity  Fe   0.109*** 0.061 0.127*** 0.163* 
  Fe^2   0.059   -0.044 
Heteroe  0.034*** 0.048*** 
W_GCOVe  0.067 0.022 0.078 0.235** 
  W_GCOVe^2   0.066   -0.230** 
  GGINIe  0.271 0.451** 0.391* 0.792*** 
  GGINIe^2   -0.784   -1.750** 
religion  Fr  0.056 0.004 0.063 -0.061 
Fr^2 0.089 0.216 
  Heteror  0.033**   0.031*   
  W_GCOVr  -0.160 -0.456 -0.067 0.026 
W_GCOVr^2 0.653* -0.204 
GGINIr  -0.403 -0.185 0.110 0.256 
  GGINIr^2   -1.67   -1.109 
spatial GGINIk -0.194 -0.723* 0.099 0.292 
  GGINIk^2   1.529*   -0.559 
Notes: the reported numbers are the coefficients of the effect of horizontal inequality on growth with the same covariates 
as in Table 2.  
*10% significant. 
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
 
 
5.2 Inequality and Employment 
 
5.2.1 Vertical Inequality 
 
We now turn to see the estimation results for the unemployment model. The main results are 
presented in Table 6. As in the growth model, we split our dataset into two periods (2000–
2005 and 2006–2011) and construct the average of initial vertical inequality (2000–2005) and 
subsequent unemployment rate (2006–2011). The results indicate that there is no significant 
relationship between initial consumption Gini and subsequent unemployment rate.  
 
However, there is a significant nonlinear relationship (U-shape) between the initial education 
Gini and subsequent unemployment. At first, an increase in initial education Gini reduces 
unemployment rate in the subsequent period, but after the peak point, further increase in 
education inequality increases unemployment. The coefficients imply that the peak point is 
0.17, which coincides with the mean of education Gini ratio across kabupaten during 2000–
2012. There are no coefficients of control variables which are significant, except the initial 
unemployment rate and proportion of the youth population. 
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Table 6. How Initial Vertical Education Inequality (2000–2005) Relates to Subsequent 
Unemployment Rate (2006–2011) 
  Linear Function Nonlinear Function 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
gini0005 -0.038 0.306 
(0.027) (0.248) 
gini0005_2 -0.611 
(0.433) 
edugini0005 0.012 -2.792** 
(0.08) (1.328) 
edugini0005_2 8.549** 
(4.121) 
lpcgrdp0005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
unemployment0005 0.486*** 0.488*** 0.479*** 0.482*** 
(0.04) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
p00005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lpopulasi0005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
asphaltroad0005 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
yearofschoolm0005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
yearofschoolf0005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
young0005 0.056*** 0.053** 0.061*** 0.052** 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
mountain0005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
_cons -0.009 -0.015 -0.058 0.212** 
  (0.018) (0.025) (0.039) (0.106) 
Island dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.68 0.678 0.682 0.684 
N 287 287 287 287 
Note: The numbers below the coefficients are robust standard errors. 
*10% significant.  
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
 
As in the case with consumption inequality, to check if different period splitting will give 
different results, we re-estimate the model using different beginning and end points. We 
estimate the models using the same covariates as in the main models for unemployment in 
Table 6. The results are presented in Table 7 for consumption inequality and Table 8 for 
education inequality.  
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Table 7. How Initial Consumption Inequality Relates to Subsequent Unemployment 
Beginning Period 
  Endpoint Period 
  2003–2005 2006–2008 2009–2011 
Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear 
2000-2002 Gini -0.040 0.494 -0.085* 0.560 -0.065** 0.569** 
Gini^2   -0.965   -1.166*   -1.144** 
2003-2005 Gini -0.025 0.225 -0.005 0.214 
Gini^2       -0.436   -0.383 
2006-2008 Gini -0.019 0.162 
Gini^2           -0.299 
Notes: The reported numbers are the coefficients of the effect of inequality on growth with the same covariates as in Table 6  
*10% significant. 
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
 
Table 8.  How Initial Education Inequality Relates to Subsequent Unemployment 
Beginning Period 
  Endpoint Period 
  2003–2005 2006–2008 2009–2011 
Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear 
2000-2002 Edugini  -0.063 -1.554 -0.049 -4.394** -0.080 -2.701* 
Edugini^2   4.534   13.210**   7.969* 
2003-2005 Edugini 0.112 -2.283** -0.029 -2.444** 
Edugini^2       7.415**   7.474** 
2006-2008 Edugini -0.019 0.162 
Edugini^2           -0.299 
Notes: the reported numbers are the coefficients of the effect of inequality on growth with the same covariates as in Table 6. 
*10% significant.  
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
 
Table 7 shows that using 2000–2002 as the beginning point, there is a negative and significant 
linear relationship between initial consumption Gini ratio and subsequent unemployment rates 
in 2006–2008 and 2009–2011. In the nonlinear model, there is an inverted-U shape relationship 
between initial consumption Gini ratio in 2000–2002 and subsequent unemployment rates in 
2006–2008 and 2009–2011, although only the coefficient of the square term which is significant 
in the former period.  
 
The results for education inequality in Table 8, however, confirm that it has a U-shape 
relationship with the unemployment rate over both medium and long terms. The 2000–2002 
and 2003–2005 beginning points have significant relationships with the 2006–2008 and 2009–
2011 end points. 
 
 
5.2.2 Horizontal Inequality 
 
A summary of the estimation results of the effects of fractionalization and horizontal 
inequalities on economic growth is presented in Table 9. We use initial horizontal inequality in 
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2000 as the main independent variable and subsequent long-term unemployment rates 
(geometric mean 2001–2012) and subsequent short-term unemployment rates (2001–2006) as 
the dependent variables.  
 
The results show that horizontal inequality across ethnic groups has a significant nonlinear 
(inverted U-shape) relationship with subsequent unemployment in both the short and long-
term. Meanwhile, initial fractionalization and heterogeneity across ethnic groups has no 
significant relationship with subsequent unemployment.  
 
For horizontal inequality across religious groups, the estimation results of the linear models 
suggest a negative relationship with long-term and short-term subsequent unemployment. 
However, the estimation results of the nonlinear models suggest that the relationship is U-
shaped with subsequent unemployment both in the long-term and short-term. At first, 
horizontal inequality across religious groups reduces unemployment rates, but after reaching 
the peak point, it increases unemployment.  
 
Meanwhile, the results for spatial inequality indicate that there is a nonlinear inverted U-shape 
relationship between spatial inequality across kecamatan with kabupaten unemployment rates in 
both short and long-terms. Higher inequality across kecamatan initially reduces kabupaten 
unemployment, but after reaching the peak, it increases the unemployment rates. 
 
Table 9. How Initial Fractionalization and Horizontal Inequalities Relate to  
Long-Term Subsequent Unemployment 
HI variables 2000 
Subsequent Unemployment 2001–2012 Subsequent Unemployment 2001–2006 
Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear 
ethnicity  Fe  0.001 0.021 -0.002 0.014 
  Fe^2   -0.024   -0.019 
Heteroe  0.001 -0.001 
W_GCOVe  -0.018 0.023 -0.023 0.022 
  W_GCOVe^2   -0.060***   -0.067** 
  GGINIe  -0.021 0.084** -0.035 0.080 
  GGINIe^2   -0.458***   -0.503*** 
religion  Fr  -0.009 -0.059*** -0.020** -0.085*** 
Fr^2 0.087** 0.113** 
  Heteror  -0.003   -0.006*   
  W_GCOVr  -0.056*** -0.050 -0.086*** -0.097** 
W_GCOVr^2 -0.012 0.023 
GGINIr  -0.088* -0.251** -0.162*** -0.343** 
  GGINIr^2   1.251   1.380 
spatial GGINIk -0.025 0.074* -0.038 0.058 
  GGINIk^2   -0.286***   -0.278** 
*10% significant.  
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
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VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
 
The first robustness checks consider whether our results are robust to the period of 
observations. There are two reasons why this is important: (i) The 2000–2002 period is an 
early recovery period after the Asian financial crisis (AFC), where the level of inequality was 
relatively low. The robustness checks are to ensure that our results are not driven by the first 
couple of recovery years by checking whether we get the same results if we use 2003 data as 
our first start; and (ii) There are some adjustments and changes in the methodology of Susenas 
starting in 2011. The robustness checks in this case are to ensure whether we get the same 
results if we end the period at 2010.  
 
Hence, the robustness checks are implemented by estimating two different beginning and end 
periods. The first is to estimate the model with control and island dummy using average initial 
inequality in 2000–2005 and average subsequent growth and unemployment in 2006–2010. 
The second is to estimate the model with control and island dummy using average initial 
inequality in 2003–2006 and average subsequent growth and unemployment in 2007–2010. 
The results for the growth models are presented in Table 10 and 11 and for employment 
models in Table 12 and 13.  
 
Table 10. Robustness Check for the VIs—Growth Model (1) 
Initial Inequality  
(avg. 2000–2005)  
Average Subsequent Growth 
2006–2010 
Gini 0.065 0.989* 
Gini^2   -1.642* 
Edugini  -0.063 2.224 
Edugini^2   -6.975 
*10% significant.  
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
 
Table 11. Robustness Check for the VIs—Growth Model (2) 
Initial Inequality 
(avg. 2003–2006)  
Average Subsequent Growth 
2007–2010 
Gini  0.079** 0.394 
Gini^2   -0.547 
Edugini  -0.058 1.233 
Edugini^2   -3.965 
*10% significant.  
**5% significant. 
***1% significant.  
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Table 12. Robustness Check for the VIs—Unemployment Model (1) 
Initial Inequality 
(avg. 2000–2005) 
Average Subsequent 
Unemployment 2006–2010 
Gini -0.039 0.327 
Gini^2   -0.651 
Edugini  0.015 -2.570* 
Edugini^2   7.880* 
*10% significant. 
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
 
Table 13. Robustness Check for the VIs—Unemployment Model (2) 
Initial Inequality 
(avg. 2003–2006) 
Average Subsequent 
Unemployment 2007–2010 
Gini 0.011 0.425** 
Gini^2   -0.721* 
Edugini  0.018 -1.357 
Edugini^2   4.225 
*10% significant.  
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
 
The results of the robustness check for growth show that there is a significant inverted U-
shape relationship between initial consumption inequality in 2000–2005 and subsequent 
growth in 2006–2010, as found in the previous main results. However, the effect of 
consumption Gini does not come up significantly in the another nonlinear model using 
beginning point 2003–2006 and end point 2007–2010. Rather, Table 12 indicates that there is 
a significant positive relationship between inequality in 2003–2006 and subsequent growth in 
2007-2010. 
 
For the unemployment models, the results of the robustness checks in Table 12 show 
consistency with the previous main results. Moreover, the coefficient magnitudes are also 
similar. On the contrary, the results in Table 13 are different from the previous main results. 
There is an inverted U-shape relationship between consumption Gini ratio in 2003–2006 with 
subsequent employment in 2007–2010. However, there is no significant relationship between 
education Gini in 2003–2006 and subsequent unemployment in 2007–2010.   
 
The results in Tables 10 and 12 show that the main results are robust to the exclusion of 
2011–2012 end period. However, Tables 11 and 13 indicate that the results are less robust to 
the exclusion of 2000–2002 initial period. This implies that in assessing the impact of 
inequality, it is important to take into account the context when changes in inequality occur. 
The 2000–2002 period in Indonesia is an early recovery period from a crisis where the level of 
inequality is relatively low. 
 
The second robustness check is to utilize the panel nature of the data and use alternate 
estimation methods using kabupaten/province/island fixed effects and random effects. The 
difference between those two methods is the information used to calculate the coefficients. 
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The fixed effects calculate differences within each kabupaten/province/island across time while 
the random effects calculate all information across observations and across time. The random 
effects are more efficient but they are consistent only if kabupaten/province/island effects are 
uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables (Forbes 2000).  
 
To smooth out the data, we first calculate three-yearly averages of all the variables. To deal 
with endogeneity problem, we estimate the models using lag dependent variables. Finally, we 
estimate separate regressions to test whether the impacts are different between kabupaten, 
province, and island level fixed and random effects. The results are shown in Table 14 for 
consumption inequality and Table 15 for education inequality. In these robustness checks, we 
only estimate the growth models. 
 
The results in Table 14 show that the only significant coefficients of lag of consumption Gini 
ratio are with island and province level random-effects in nonlinear (inverted U-shape) 
models. The results of Hausman tests; however, reject the assumption required for random 
effects, indicating that fixed-effects are the preferred models.4 Meanwhile, the results for 
education inequality in Table 15 produce no significant coefficients of lag of education Gini 
ratio in all specifications (linear and nonlinear) and in all levels (island/province/kabupaten) of 
fixed and random effects. Overall, these results indicate that the main models are preferable to 
the alternative models. 
 
                                                 
4For nonlinear island level-random effect model, the test statistics is chi2(10) = 20.97 which rejects the null 
hypothesis at 5% level of significance. For nonlinear province level-random effect model, the test statistics is 
chi2(10)=18.97 which rejects the null hypothesis at 10% level of significance.  
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Table 14. Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimations of Growth Models with Consumption Inequality 
 
 
Initial Inequality 
(avg. 3 years) 
Subsequent Growth (average 3 years) 
Island Province Kabupaten 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Linear Non- Linear Linear 
Non-
Linear Linear 
Non-
Linear Linear 
Non-
Linear Linear 
Non-
Linear linear 
Non- 
linear 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
L.gini -0.036 0.365 0.037 0.633* -0.036 0.358 -0.005 0.656* -0.036 0.358 -0.036 0.358 
(0.062) (0.485) (0.041) (0.348) (0.062) (0.485) (0.043) (0.373) (0.062) (0.485) (0.062) (0.485) 
L.gini2 -0.693 -1.036* -0.682 -1.149* -0.682 -0.682 
(0.834) (0.601) (0.832) (0.643) (0.832) (0.832) 
L.pcgrdp 0.000 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.unemployment -0.180*** -0.176** -0.126*** -0.129*** -0.180*** -0.176** -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.180*** -0.176** -0.180*** -0.176** 
(0.068) (0.069) (0.042) (0.042) (0.068) (0.069) (0.045) (0.045) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) 
L.asphaltroad 0.046** 0.046** 0.005 0.005 0.046** 0.046** 0.011 0.011 0.046** 0.046** 0.046** 0.046** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
L.yosf -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
L.yosm 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
L.p0 -0.002** -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.lpopulasi 0.021 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.019 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
L.young 0.032 0.036 -0.018 -0.010 0.031 0.035 -0.023 -0.014 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.035 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.030) (0.031) (0.069) (0.069) (0.032) (0.033) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
L.mountain -0.032 -0.032 -0.015* -0.014* -0.032 -0.032 -0.017* -0.017* -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
_cons -0.185 -0.220 0.021 -0.067 -0.188 -0.222 0.024 -0.071 -0.188 -0.222 -0.081 -0.121 
  (0.320) (0.323) (0.032) (0.060) (0.320) (0.323) (0.036) (0.064) (0.320) (0.323) (0.274) (0.279) 
R-sq 0.069 0.070     0.069 0.070     0.069 0.070     
N 857 857 857 857 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*10% significant.  
**5% significant. 
***1% significant.  
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Table 15. Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimations of Growth Models with Education Inequality 
Initial Inequality 
(avg. 3 years) 
Subsequent Growth (average 3 years) 
Island Province Kabupaten 
FE  RE FE RE FE RE
Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
L.edugini -0.081 -0.493 -0.033 0.620 -0.080 -0.522 -0.029 0.066 -0.080 -0.522 -0.080 -0.522 
(0.209) (2.484) (0.118) (1.768) (0.209) (2.480) (0.119) (1.794) (0.209) (2.480) (0.209) (2.480) 
L.edugini2 1.266 -1.987 1.358 -0.289 1.358 1.358 
(7.603) (5.367) (7.593) (5.457) (7.593) (7.593) 
L.pcgrdp 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.unemployment -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.180*** 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.042) (0.042) (0.068) (0.069) (0.044) (0.045) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) 
L.asphaltroad 0.046** 0.046** 0.006 0.006 0.046** 0.046** 0.011 0.011 0.046** 0.046** 0.046** 0.046** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
L.yosf -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
L.yosm 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
L.p0 -0.002** -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.lpopulasi 0.019 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
L.young 0.034 0.035 -0.018 -0.018 0.033 0.034 -0.024 -0.024 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.034 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.030) (0.030) (0.069) (0.069) (0.033) (0.033) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
L.mountain -0.031 -0.031 -0.015* -0.015* -0.031 -0.031 -0.018* -0.018* -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
_cons -0.156 -0.120 0.030 -0.023 -0.158 -0.120 0.029 0.022 -0.158 -0.120 -0.057 -0.018 
  (0.319) (0.385) (0.040) (0.148) (0.319) (0.385) (0.042) (0.150) (0.319) (0.385) (0.275) (0.348) 
R-sq 0.068 0.069     0.068 0.068     0.068 0.068     
N 857 857 857 857 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*10% significant. 
**5% significant. 
***1% significant. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Increasing inequality is a growing concern is many parts of the world, including Indonesia. 
This paper presents an effort to search for empirical evidence of the impact of inequality on 
economic growth and unemployment in the Indonesian context. After the Asian financial 
crisis at the end of the 1990s, Indonesia has experienced a significant and continuing increase 
in inequality. This is in contrast with the relatively stable inequality that Indonesia experienced 
during the three decades of high economic growth before the crisis.  
 
The results of analyses in this study suggest that inequality does matter for economic growth 
and unemployment. However, different measures of inequality associate with each outcome 
measure differently. Overall, the findings indicate that consumption inequality affects growth, 
while education inequality seems to be more important for unemployment. In general, the 
impact of inequality is nonlinear in the form of inverted U-shape for growth and U-shape for 
unemployment. 
 
Similarly, horizontal inequality across ethnic groups is also found to have nonlinear inverted 
U-shape relationship with growth. Meanwhile, horizontal inequality across religion groups has 
nonlinear U-shape relationship with unemployment.  
 
These findings suggest that we should treat inequality very cautiously. Initially inequality may 
not be harmful for growth and employment; however, after reaching a threshold, it will have 
an adverse impact. This implies that it is important to put in place policies to address 
increasing inequality and to mitigate its harmful impact.  
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APPENDIX 1  
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics of Key Variables  
  Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables      
        Kabupaten GRDP growth, 2000-2012 (%) 3576 0.055647 0.052544 -0.46749 1.16728 
        Kabupaten unemployment rate, 2000-2012 
(%) 
3799 0.078588 0.043511 0.004062 0.392763 
Vertical Inequality (2000-2012)      
         Consumtion inequality 3799 0.292087 0.053049 0.170084 0.800361 
         Education Gini 3797 0.17287 0.013327 0.106866 0.21503 
Horizontal Gini (2000)      
Ethnic group      
          Weighted group coefficient of variation 297 0.131803 0.101474 0.016038 1.084758 
          Group Gini 297 0.047854 0.047713 0.000833 0.418329 
Religious group      
          Weighted group coefficient of variation 297 0.085694 0.062351 0.005326 0.692287 
          Group Gini 297 0.020505 0.026112 0.000321 0.18172 
Spatial group      
          Weighted group coefficient of variation 297 0.187006 0.112901 0.009558 1.049123 
          Group Gini 297 0.095601 0.055671 0.004777 0.491815 
Horizontal Gini (2010)      
Ethnic group      
           Weighted group coefficient of variation 297 0.100259 0.066431 0.003869 0.56537 
           Group Gini 297 0.034874 0.031265 2.89E-05 0.282706 
Religious group      
          Weighted group coefficient of variation 297 0.066422 0.050184 0.010538 0.461693 
          Group Gini 297 0.015071 0.019332 0.000334 0.209098 
Fractionalization (2000)      
         Religious group   297 0.154099 0.177807 0.001342 0.702915 
         Ethnic group 297 0.3803 0.305164 0.004008 0.880296 
Fractionalization (2010)      
         Religious group   297 0.149445 0.159212 0.002376 0.629252 
         Ethnic group 297 0.355231 0.283329 0.000144 0.881066 
Heterogeneity (2000)      
         Religious group (0, 1) 297 0.444444 0.497743 0 1 
         Ethnic group (0, 1) 297 0.693603 0.461775 0 1 
Heterogeneity (2010)      
         Religious group (0, 1) 297 0.444444 0.497743 0 1 
         Ethnic group (0, 1) 297 0.693603 0.461775 0 1 
Continued 
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Appendix 1. Continued  
 Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Control variables      
Poverty rate (%) 2961 16.66025 9.158474 1.41 53.22491 
 Log GRDP per capita (in million Rupiahs) 3795 1.684674 0.669265 0.217366 4.866916 
 Log of total population 3795 13.19987 0.849044 10.21691 15.51395 
Mean years of schooling male (year) 3797 6.985795 1.783677 1.676342 12.07333 
Mean years of schooling female (yr) 3797 5.710594 1.84655 0.720779 11.42222 
 Proportion of young people (%) 3799 0.314172 0.06686 0.14215 0.731574 
 Share of villages with asphalt main road (%) 1429 0.67893 0.259073 0 1 
 Share of villages in mountainous areas 1429 0.190138 0.17783 0 1 
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